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ACTA, FOOL: EXPLAINING THE IRRATIONAL 
SUPPORT FOR A NEW INSTITUTION 
 
Gabriel J. Michael* 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
The key players in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
negotiations were driven to establish a new institution for intellectual 
property enforcement because the traditional venues for such matters, the 
WTO and WIPO, had become inhospitable forums. Yet given the 
significant division in U.S. domestic economic interests over ACTA’s 
provisions and the lack of solid theoretical or empirical evidence 
supporting claims made by proponents of the agreement, it is puzzling that 
ACTA has commanded the support of the U.S. executive, even across two 
administrations from opposing political parties. I show why this support 
cannot be explained as a result of the aggregation of domestic economic 
interests, or as a result of rational policymaking. I then argue that an 
irrational but captivating “policy paradigm” better explains the support of 
the U.S. executive.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
After years of efforts by the U.S. and other advanced industrial states to 
consolidate international intellectual property policy within the multilateral 
institutions of WIPO and the WTO, the recent past has seen a concerted 
effort by a number of countries to devolve a subset of such policy, namely 
IP enforcement, to a different institution. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) is the prime example of such efforts. In spite of the 
existence of well-established institutions such as WIPO and the WTO, 
which have nearly universal membership and a high degree of institutional 
expertise and perceived legitimacy, advanced industrial states have chosen 
to blaze a new path—a costly move that has attracted significant attention, 
both positive and negative. Why? In short, it is because the existing 
institutions have become inhospitable forums for these key states to 
advance their interests. 
Recent years have witnessed a shift in the institutional character of 
WIPO, especially since the proposal and subsequent adoption of the 
Development Agenda. For example, Jeremy De Beer has called the 
Development Agenda “an attempted paradigm shift for IP policies in the 
twenty-first century. It is normatively different than the underdevelopment 
agenda of the last twentieth century.”1 Yet from the beginning, the idea of a 
development agenda and the potential shift in the nature of WIPO 
engendered discontent among other, primarily advanced industrial, member 
states. These states, including the U.S., EU, Japan, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, did not believe that WIPO 
                                         
1
 IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA,  3 (Jeremy De Beer ed.,  2009). 
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needed to engage with development issues.
2
 
Margaret Chon argues that a similar “encounter” with development also 
took place within the WTO; frustration with the perceived inflexibility of 
TRIPS and the challenges of the AIDS pandemic led to a greater focus on 
development and public health, culminating in the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health and the ongoing Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA).
3
 However, for the past several years the Doha Round has been 
stalled. A variety of contentious trade issues have conspired against 
progress in the negotiations, and the potential for placing yet another set of 
contentious IP issues on the table is limited. 
As a result, neither WIPO nor the WTO are attractive forums for the 
introduction of new provisions on IP enforcement. The result has been that 
the key states behind the push for expanded IP enforcement have been 
forced to resort to limited plurilateral negotiations. Enter ACTA: according 
to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), parties to 
the ACTA negotiations currently include “Australia, Canada, the European 
Union and its 27 member states, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland.”4 Unsurprisingly, there is an 
enormous degree of overlap between these states and the states that 
originally expressed opposition to the WIPO Development Agenda some 
years ago.
5
 
Thus, in one sense, that these states have resorted to a new institution is 
entirely rational, a case fitting somewhere between the theoretical concepts 
of forum-shopping and regime-shifting.
6
 What requires further explanation 
is why governments came to the conclusion that new policies on IP 
enforcement were necessary in the first place. Particularly, what explains 
the unabated support of the U.S. executive for ACTA, beginning with the 
                                         
2
 See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2821, 2847 (2005). 
3
 Id. at 2844. 
4
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT (ACTA), http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Jun 12, 2010). 
5
 The presence of some states in the ACTA negotiations that have not traditionally 
caucused with the highly developed, WIPO “Group B” countries is easily explained by the 
presence of free trade agreements (FTAs): the U.S. has already negotiated bilateral FTAs 
with South Korea (not yet ratified), Singapore, and Morocco, and the trilateral North 
American FTA (NAFTA) explains Mexico’s presence in the negotiations. 
Other states that have bilateral FTAs with the U.S. are thus likely to be candidates for 
accession to ACTA once the agreement is completed. These include Bahrain, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, 
Jordan, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, and Peru. 
6
 See Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute 
Settlement in International Trade, 61 INT'L ORG. 735-761 (2007); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 571-577 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting in 
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Republican Bush administration in 2007, and continuing without a hitch 
into the Democratic Obama administration in 2009? Two common 
explanations are that this support can be explained as a result of the 
aggregation of domestic economic interests, or that it is the result of rational 
policymaking. 
 
II. EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR ACTA BY DOMESTIC ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
 
A large literature in political science is devoted to explaining the 
possibility and conditions of various forms of international cooperation. 
One major strand within this literature argues that the preferences of 
domestic actors are a critical component in determining whether 
international cooperation will emerge and what form and substance it will 
have. That is, domestic actors—such as special interest groups or industry 
trade associations—will have a profound effect on the success or failure of 
an international agreement like ACTA.
7
 
Consider one standard presentation of this domestic preferences 
argument. Helen Milner argues that the “likelihood and terms of 
international cooperation depend on the preferences of the interest groups 
involved in the policy area… the structure of domestic preferences is of 
critical importance.”8 She simplifies the domestic arena down to three basic 
actors: the executive, the legislature, and societal actors or interest groups. 
The interests of the executive and legislature are similar: both wish to retain 
office, although given that they have different constituencies, their 
preferences may diverge. The interest of societal actors such as businesses 
is to maximize income.
9
 
How well does ACTA fit this model? One immediately apparent 
difference is that in large part the debate over ACTA has excluded the 
legislature as an actor. With the exception of a few members of Congress, 
we have not witnessed extensive Congressional involvement.
10
 This can be 
readily explained by the nature of ACTA: as a sole executive agreement, 
                                                                                                       
the International Intellectual Property System, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 39-44 (2009). 
7
 See DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY REGIMES 39 (2007)(offering a related theoretical description that 
"government preferences on regulatory issues have their origins in the domestic political 
economy"). 
8
 HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC 
POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 60 (1997). 
9
 See Id. at 33. That Milner chooses to use the word “income” rather than the more 
general “utility” may indicate the relative importance she assigns to interest groups 
motivated by non-financial purposes. 
10
 Aside from letters sent by Senators Bernie Sanders, Sherrod Brown, and Ron Wyden 
to the USTR, Congressional involvement has been limited.  
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approval by the Senate is not required. The only remaining governmental 
actor is the executive.  
Executives, interested in reelection, have two primary concerns: 
performance of “the overall economy and the preferences of interest groups 
that support them.”11 Regarding economic performance, although economic 
competitiveness and job retention and creation have been cited as reasons 
for supporting ACTA by the Obama administration, the empirical effect of 
stronger IP enforcement on the economy will be entirely overshadowed by 
the larger macroeconomic doldrums of the past few years. This leaves one 
major concern for the executive: how best to respond to the preferences of 
interest groups willing to support it. In order to determine this, the executive 
must ask the question: what are the economic preferences of domestic 
interest groups regarding ACTA? 
Given that both the Bush and Obama administrations’ positions on 
ACTA have been characterized by unmitigated support, one would predict 
that domestic interest groups are substantially unified in their support for 
ACTA; alternatively, there might be a core group of strong supporters, and 
a peripheral group with a more ambivalent attitude. Neither is this case. 
When it comes to ACTA, the U.S. domestic arena is in upheaval. While 
there is a predictable list of groups that support ACTA for readily 
identifiable reasons, there are also a significant number of groups that 
oppose it. In between the two camps are some powerful players with 
shifting allegiances. 
Domestic actors that have expressed support for ACTA include the 
usual suspects: the International Trademark Association, various copyright 
associations, the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Motion Picture 
Association of America, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America, and 
others.
12
 The somewhat simplistic question “will this policy increase the 
domestic actor’s net income” predicts the direction of preferences in these 
cases quite well. 
Similarly, those actors whose bottom line clearly stands to be harmed by 
ACTA have expressed their opposition. The Computer and 
Communications Industry Association (CCIA), Consumer Electronics 
Association, and TechAmerica (a technology industry group with about 
                                         
11
 See MILNER, supra note 8. at 34-35. 
12
 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 4; Motion Picture 
Association of America, LETTER TO CHAIRMAN LEAHY (2009), available at 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/mpaa-acta-letter-20091119.pdf (last visited Sep. 13, 
2010); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America, PHRMA SUPPORTS NEW AGREEMENT 
DESIGNED TO ENFORCE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING LAWS (Oct. 3, 2007), 
http://www.phrma.org/phrma-supports-new-agreement-designed-enforce-anti-
counterfeiting-laws (last visited Aug 26, 2010). 
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1500 members of various sizes) have all indicated strong opposition to 
ACTA in its current form.
13
 Should ACTA be adopted, members of these 
groups could experience either increased costs of business or slackened 
sales. 
In between these two poles, however, lies a morass. Although some 
internet service providers may view ACTA’s internet provisions as 
burdensome, the interests of large businesses that have a hand in both 
internet service provision and media distribution, such as Verizon and 
Comcast, are harder to predict.
14
 Recently, the Intellectual Property Owners 
Association, an umbrella group that includes a number of U.S. 
pharmaceutical, chemical, software, and industrial firms, submitted a letter 
detailing its concern that “ACTA goes far beyond the subject matter of 
counterfeiting;” this comes after the same group filed a letter in support of 
ACTA a year before.
15
 In some cases the same businesses are members of 
both a group that supports and a group that opposes ACTA (e.g., Microsoft 
and Intuit are members of both the BSA and the CCIA). Debate over the 
inclusion of geographical indications in ACTA threatens to draw U.S. food, 
wine, and spirits trade groups into the fray, as observers have raised the 
possibility of Kraft Parmesan Cheese being seized at the EU border.
16
 
Given these divisions, the aggregation of U.S. domestic economic 
preferences does not offer clear support for ACTA. An alternative 
explanation for the steadfast support of the U.S. executive is that this 
support is the result of rational policymaking. 
                                         
13
 See CCIA, DETAILS OF SECRET IP AGREEMENT CONFIRM TECH INDUSTRY FEARS 
(April 21, 2010), http://www.ccianet.org/index.asp?sid=5&artid=154 (last visited Jun 15, 
2010); Press Release, Consumer Electronics Association, Computer & Communications 
Industry Association, and TechAmerica, CCIA, CEA AND TechAmerica Urge Obama 
Administration to Pursue a More Focused Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (June 4, 
2010), http://www.ce.org/Press/CurrentNews/press_release_detail.asp?id=11913 (last 
visited Jun 15, 2010). 
14
 See Michael Geist, ROGERS: WE'RE CONCERNED WITH THE ACTA NEGOTIATIONS 
AND THREE STRIKES (May 12, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5030/125/ 
(last visited Aug 26, 2010). 
15
 Intellectual Property Owners Association, IPO COMMENTS TO USTR KIRK RE: 
ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT PUBLIC PRE-DECISIONAL/DELIBERATIVE 
DRAFT APRIL 2010 2 (2010), 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfm&CONTENTID=26212; Intellectual Property Owners Association, LETTER FROM 
IPO TO USTR RON KIRK REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (2009), 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cf
m&ContentID=23141. 
16
 See EU-US food fight hampers ACTA talks,  EURACTIV (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-us-food-fight-hampers-acta-talks-news-
496958?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=370bb02be0-
my_google_analytics_key&utm_medium=email (last visited Aug 25, 2010). 
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III. EXPLAINING  SUPPORT FOR ACTA AS RATIONAL POLICYMAKING  
 
If the U.S. executive’s support for ACTA were the result of rational 
policymaking, one would expect substantial theoretical and empirical 
evidence supporting the undertaking. Yet the theory and empirics of IP 
enforcement, as well as IP policy generally, are highly contested. 
To begin with, there already exists robust debate over the economic 
effectiveness, appropriateness and value of most of the IP rights for which 
ACTA seeks stronger enforcement. There is significant disagreement over 
the optimal level and length of IP protection, if and how that protection 
ought to vary from one economic sector to another, and the extent to which 
IP protection is helpful or harmful to economic development.
17
 A large 
literature discusses whether copyright is a necessary incentive for creative 
activity at all, and if so, what the appropriate term length of copyright ought 
to be.
18
 Another related literature raises questions about the value and 
effectiveness of trademarks and geographical indications.
19
 As for patents, 
their value appears to be critical in the pharmaceutical and chemical 
manufacturing industries, but much less so in the aerospace and computer 
technology manufacturing sectors; furthermore, despite being ostensibly 
targeted at rewarding and encouraging innovation, patents are also used as a 
legal weapon against competitors and new market entrants.
20
 
Turning to the specific reasoning used to justify ACTA, supporters have 
cited connections between IP infringement and organized crime, and argue 
that IP infringement endangers consumers. Yet the GAO’s recent analysis 
of counterfeiting and piracy notes that a 2009 RAND study on the 
connection between organized crime, terrorism, and film piracy provided 
                                         
17
 See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: 
An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 THE 
RAND J. OF ECON. 101, 101-128 (2001); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698-
701 (1998); KEITH E MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY [no page cite included] (2000). 
18
 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Raymond 
Shih Ray Ku, Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of 
Digital Technology, The, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002); William M Landes & Richard A 
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). 
19
 See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1989); 
Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809 
(2010). 
20
 See Carlos A. Primo Braga, Carsten Fink & Claudia Paz Sepulveda, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Economic Development,  in THE WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 267, 276 (Keith E. Maskus ed.,  2004). 
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only “anecdotal evidence” of a link; furthermore, the study in question 
clearly states that online film piracy, one of the targets of ACTA’s Internet 
chapter, has no apparent connection to organized crime or terrorism.
21
 To 
the extent that there exists a real connection between large-scale 
manufacture and distribution of counterfeit goods and organized crime, the 
RAND report portrays the activity of counterfeiting as one illegal activity 
among many others engaged in by such groups, with the implication that in 
order to combat organized crime, more law enforcement resources should 
be targeted directly at organized crime, rather than peripheral illegal 
activities such as IP infringement. 
As for the connection between IP infringement and consumer safety, 
consumers may be as likely or even more likely to be harmed by 
substandard quality products that do not infringe any IP rights as they are by 
IP infringing products. Several well-publicized incidents involving the 
introduction of diethylene glycol into imported toothpaste have occurred 
both with products falsely labeled with the “Colgate” brand name, as well 
as generic brands that do not appear to have infringed any trademarks.
22
 
Likewise, in one of the largest medicine contamination incidents in recent 
years, during March 2008 a large amount of contaminated supplies of the 
blood thinner heparin were linked to more than eighty deaths in the U.S.
23
 
Investigators traced the source of the contamination back to Chinese plants 
substituting or diluting the active ingredient with a cheaper and more widely 
available—but ineffective—alternative. However, as Baxter was 
legitimately importing the contaminated material for distribution in the 
U.S., no intellectual property issues were implicated. If concern over 
consumer safety is truly paramount, it would make more sense to target 
regulation at low-quality, substandard, or potentially toxic products directly, 
perhaps by increasing funding to the chronically underfunded FDA, rather 
than peripherally through the enforcement of trademarks, which may not 
                                         
21
 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND 
PIRATED GOODS 13 (April 12, 2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10423.pdf (last 
visited Jun 15, 2010); TREVERTON, GREOGRY F. ET AL., FILM PIRACY, ORGANIZED CRIME, 
AND TERRORISM 38 (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG742/ 
(last visited Sep. 14 2010) . 
22
 See Stephanie Bodoni, Hugo Miller & Naween Mangi, Asian counterfeiters shift 
focus to consumer goods from luxury goods, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/business/worldbusiness/15iht-fake.4.6159215.html 
(last visited Jun 15, 2010); Walt Bogdanich, Toxic Toothpaste Made in China Is Found in 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/02/us/02toothpaste.html 
(last visited Jun 15, 2010). 
23
 See Gardiner Harris, U.S. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/health/policy/22fda.html (last visited 
Aug 26, 2010). 
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always be implicated. 
Finally, from a purely economic perspective, consumers who are aware 
they are purchasing knockoff items may in fact benefit, either from direct 
consumer surplus or from access to items they would otherwise have been 
unable to afford.
24
 For example, according to some purchasers, trademark-
infringing handbags mimicking the fashion season’s newest (and most 
expensive) styles make great gifts; and in China, so-called “shanzhai” 
(black market) cell phones that mimic the style of legitimate phones but add 
new features and sell for a fraction of the cost are popular with consumers.
25
 
Thus, neither the aggregation of domestic economic interests nor 
rational policymaking offer convincing explanations for the U.S. 
executive’s consistent support of ACTA. This support can in large part be 
better explained by a firm, and potentially misplaced, faith amongst U.S. 
policymakers of the importance of IP to economic growth, development, 
and competition. Undergirding this faith is a set of related norms and values 
that together constitute what is called a “policy paradigm.” 
 
IV. EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR ACTA ANOTHER WAY: POLICY PARADIGMS 
 
As discussed, the theory and empirics of intellectual property and its 
economic effects are complicated. In order to cope with this complexity, 
policymakers, bureaucrats and administrators filter information through 
what have been called “policy paradigms”: frameworks that allow them to 
simplify complex economic relationships into ones that are more easily 
understandable, if not entirely accurate.
26
 A policy paradigm is “a 
framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy 
and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very 
nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing.”27 
There is evidence of a distinct policy paradigm operating at the USTR, 
                                         
24
 See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J. L. & ECON. 211 
(1986). 
25
 See Ruth La Ferla, Carried Away With Imitation Luxury, N.Y. TIMES, December 13, 
2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/13/fashion/13FAKES.html?ref=counterfeit_merchandise 
(last visited Jun 17, 2010); David Barboza, In China, Knockoff Cellphones Are a Hit, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 27, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/technology/28cell.html?ref=counterfeit_merchandise 
(last visited Jun 17, 2010). 
26
 See Brian C. Rathbun, Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple 
Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory., 51 INT'L STUD. Q. 533, 
546 (2007). 
27
 Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of 
Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 279 (1993). 
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and evidence of attempts by certain domestic actors to support that 
paradigm. Specifically, there are several recurring motifs present in the 
various ACTA-related documents produced by the USTR and in 
communications filed in support of ACTA.
28
 These include claims that 
infringement of intellectual property or counterfeiting and piracy: 1) result 
in a loss of jobs and revenue to businesses; 2) hinder economic growth and 
development, both in developed and developing countries; 3) pose a threat 
to public health and safety, endangering both American consumers and 
consumers in the developing world; 4) support organized crime; 5) 
discourage innovation and creativity; 6) result in lost tax revenue; and 7) 
pose a national security risk. 
For one example among the many available, consider the USTR’s 
primary public webpage for ACTA. It states that the agreement is: 
 
intended to assist in the efforts of governments around the 
world to more effectively combat the proliferation of 
counterfeit and pirated goods, which undermines legitimate 
trade and the sustainable development of the world 
economy, and in some cases contributes to organized crime 
and exposes American families to dangerous fake 
products.
29
 
 
This colorful description emphasizes connections between IP 
infringement and development, crime, and safety. A similar paradigm may 
be at work with other negotiating parties. For example, the Swiss Institut für 
Geistiges Eigentum (federal intellectual property agency) offers the 
following answer to questions about the effect of ACTA on citizens: 
 
The main goal of ACTA is to combat the large 
counterfeiting and piracy activities which present big risks 
                                         
28
 See Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight 
Fakes, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, (2007), 
http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-
fight-fakes (last visited Jun 12, 2010); Fact Sheet: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, (2007), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file122_13414.pdf; ACTA - Summary 
of Key Elements Under Discussion, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, (2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-
sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-discussion (last visited Jun 12, 
2010); Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 4; Letter from Ron 
Kirk, Ambassador, to Senator Ron Wyden (2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1700; 
Letter from the International Trademark Association to Barak Obama, President of the 
United States (2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1737. 
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for public safety and health… The consequences of 
counterfeiting and piracy touch everyone and are daily 
hazards. Counterfeiting and piracy do not only infringe on 
intellectual property rights and cause enormous economic 
losses. They present a direct threat to consumer and patient 
health and safety.
30
 
 
Again, a document made available by the European Commission, the 
executive body of the EU, sounds remarkably similar: 
 
ACTA is about tackling activities pursued by criminal 
organisations, which frequently pose a threat to public 
health and safety. It is not about limiting civil liberties or 
harassing consumers. The gangs behind this traffic are 
often the same that do drug trafficking or money 
laundering.
31
 
 
Clearly, these connections are oversimplified. As the previous section 
notes, many of these justifications do not have clear theoretical or empirical 
foundations. Even where evidence of a connection between IP infringement 
and harmful effects exists, the evidence is often disputed or balanced with 
alternative evidence. Yet these connections provide an attractive narrative 
and simple interpretation of the economic effects of intellectual property 
enforcement. The policy paradigm frames the evidence, structures the 
problem, and offers a simple solution: more and better enforcement. In 
contrast, evidence-based rational policymaking complicates the entire 
matter and offers no clear path forward. For the U.S. executive, whether 
Republican or Democratic, Bush or Obama, policymaking that relies on a 
policy paradigm is easier, and has the advantage of a historical legacy. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The current states negotiating ACTA clearly envision the expansion of 
the agreement to include more countries.
32
 As suggested above, the first 
                                                                                                       
29
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 4. 
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push for expansion of ACTA will likely occur in countries with which the 
U.S. already has an existing FTA, and present an IP enforcement problem 
from the U.S. perspective. This might include countries such as Chile and 
Israel, both of which have made recent appearances on the USTR’s Special 
301 Priority Watch List. Accession to ACTA may be made a condition of 
future FTAs negotiated between the U.S. or E.U. and other countries. 
Recent press coverage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership suggests that the 
U.S. may be taking a similar approach to negotiating IP provisions there as 
it did with ACTA. But before expansion of ACTA or the duplication of its 
provisions in other agreements, we should ask two questions. First, why, if 
stronger IP enforcement is critical to economic growth and development, 
combating organized crime, and ensuring public health and consumer 
safety, is there a dearth of consistent, peer-reviewed evidence demonstrating 
these connections?
33
 Second, to the extent that serious problems of 
development, organized crime and terrorism, and public health and 
consumer safety do exist, why should we not target these problems directly, 
making effective use of limited resources, rather than peripherally through 
the mechanism of IP enforcement? 
Although policy paradigms are often simpler and more attractive than 
evidence-based policymaking, and although they often possess the 
advantage of historical legacy suggesting a kind of path dependency, it is 
not impossible for a paradigm to shift. Hall suggests that repeated failures 
of policy, combined with pressure from outsiders presenting alternative 
understandings of how policy ought to be made, can eventually result in a 
radical shift, altering both the instruments of policy and its fundamental 
goals.
34
  
Academics and others involved in public interest analyses of ACTA and 
the broader enforcement agenda will thus have a continued role to play in 
this debate. 
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